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
CAMBODIA: Civilian fuel stocks in Phnom Penh are again nearly exhausted.

The US Embassy reports that, despite the recent delivery of some oil products via Mekong River convoys, industrial fuel supplies in the capital now are depleted. Moreover, fuel oil for one of the city's two main power plants, as well as gasoline, will run out early next week unless fresh stocks are received. Cambodian Army stocks are expected to last until about 20 February.

A large POL convoy from South Vietnam was scheduled to arrive at Phnom Penh this week, but it reportedly stopped at the South Vietnamese military base at Neak Luong instead and then went back to South Vietnam. It appears that the convoy turned back for security reasons; Neak Luong does not have facilities for storing large amounts of POL.

In an effort to help meet the fuel crisis, the government has charted four large barges and a small tanker from a Philippine firm. Two of these barges were to have been in the last convoy and two more are expected to arrive in Saigon in the next few days to load petroleum products for Phnom Penh. Other emergency measures, such as using convoys of tank trucks to move supplies from Saigon, are being used. Such convoys, however, would have a difficult time meeting even the capital's minimum needs. It is not yet known when Route 4 will be ready for a resumption of petroleum shipments from the refinery at Kompong Som. It appears, therefore, that some fuel oil supplies will have to be airlifted from Saigon to ensure the operation of key industrial and power plants.

Even a partial blackout at this stage could have a serious effect on the morale of the city's population. More importantly, it would also facilitate the movement of Communist terrorists throughout the capital.



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
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KOREA: Disposition of the North Korean pilot who crash-landed his MIG-15 in South Korea last December continues to be a thorny issue for all parties concerned.

Pyongyang, increasingly frustrated by Seoul's insistence that the pilot is a defector, is adopting a more threatening tone in its public commentary on the matter. A recent North Korean news service item contained an implicit warning that unless the pilot is returned, any South Korean or UN command personnel who may be apprehended in North Korean territory in the future will face indefinite incarceration. The item claimed that in the past North Korea had dealt "leniently" with the crews and passengers of civilian and military aircraft and ships--including the Pueblo--who had "intruded."

For their part, the South Koreans may realize that they acted too hastily in labeling the pilot a genuine defector, because they now see him as a possible quid pro quo for the remaining South Korean airline passengers and crew hijacked to North Korea in 1969. Even though some deal or swap may eventually be worked out, early resolution of the issue seems unlikely because this is an election year in the South and the Pak government is even more concerned than usual about matters of prestige.



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ECUADOR-OAS: Ecuador is trying to extract maximum political mileage from the tuna boat incidents by formally presenting its case against the US in the OAS.

President Velasco will gain little practical benefit from this move, but he will continue to reap favorable publicity at home and abroad. So far the President has successfully depicted the seizure of US vessels as the act of an aggrieved but defiant victim of US economic interests. His decision to request a special meeting of OAS foreign ministers following the breakdown of negotiations with the US was made because he knows that other Latin nations will back him on such nationalistic issues as fishing rights and the claim of a 200-mile territorial sea limit. Yesterday's vote (22 to 0 with the US abstaining) to convoke the meeting reflects this solidarity. Ecuador will contend that the US violated article 19 of the OAS Charter, which forbids economic coercion, when it suspended military sales following the seizure of the tuna boats.

The current OAS special assembly dealing with terrorism apparently will simply reconvene on Saturday as a foreign ministers' meeting. The special assembly is already having problems trying to hammer out an agreement on terrorism and kidnaping and the associated issues of extradition and asylum. The opening debates only emphasized the contrasting opinions of such states as Mexico and Chile, which desire a narrow convention that does not infringe on the right of asylum, and others like Brazil and Argentina, which favor a broadly defined agreement. Bolivia has further complicated the situation by stating that the UN is the proper forum for a discussion of such a treaty. The Ecuadorean-US dispute in any event clouded the atmosphere during these initial sessions, and with attention now shifting to the coming conflict the prospects for success at the current session are poor.

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CUBA: Castro has openly admitted that Cuba is having serious difficulties with the 1971 sugar harvest.

During a conversation on Monday with members of the National Food Industry Plenum, Castro said that the harvest is falling considerably behind schedule and that only 15 percent of the cane has been harvested to date. Acknowledging that Cuba cannot carry out this year's sugar harvest by "traditional methods," Castro announced that the "new" technique of burning the cane fields before cutting would be implemented immediately in order to increase the productivity of the cane cutters and to save manpower.

Before the revolution, this technique was widely used in Cuba but was abandoned by Castro because it reduces milling yields unless the cane is ground within a short time after cutting. Slow delivery of cane to the mills has been a major problem for a number of years, however, and widespread use of the burning technique may again force milling yields back to the very low levels of last year.

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
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TURKEY: Left-wing labor is planning a demonstration in Istanbul soon that could get out of hand.

Up to 60,000 workers affiliated with the leftist labor organization DISK plan to converge on the central square to protest tax increases and the high cost of living. A similar demonstration last June brought martial law to the Istanbul area. Although DISK leaders reportedly have discouraged extremist participation and have stressed the need for nonviolence, they admit there could be trouble. The Revolutionary Student Federation, which regards DISK as a participant in the struggle against "fascism," may try to exploit the demonstration.

Meanwhile, the tempo of the student protest against the government's new policy of firmness is beginning to pick up in Ankara and has spread to Istanbul.



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PAKISTAN: This week's meetings between East and West Pakistani party leaders could determine the form of the future government or whether a constitution can be written.

The National Assembly, which will probably hold its first meeting next month, has been assigned the task of writing the new constitution. Mujibur Rahman's Awami League will have a majority in the assembly, but represents only East Pakistan. The Pakistan People's Party of Z. A. Bhutto, meanwhile, holds over half the West Pakistani seats.

Bhutto and Mujib are now meeting in Dacca, East Pakistan, to try to resolve their differences over the constitution. The most important subject they will discuss will be Mujib's six-point program for provincial autonomy, which in its present form leaves the central government responsible only for defense and foreign affairs. Bhutto is on record as favoring a large degree of provincial autonomy, but he apparently believes Mujib's six points go too far in decentralization.

If the two leaders are able to reach a compromise on the autonomy issue, other constitutional questions can probably be settled fairly easily. On the other hand, should the meetings end in clear disagreement, it will mean that the National Assembly itself will have great difficulty in drafting a constitution acceptable to both wings of the country.

President Yahya Khan met with Mujib and Bhutto earlier this month but it is still unclear what success he had in laying the groundwork for constitutional agreement. There are, however, several indications that he was satisfied with the results of the meetings.



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DAHOMY: With President Maga in Chad for an African regional meeting, the Dahomean military reportedly is closely watching the outcome of a student strike that began a few days ago. Although student demands are apparently legitimate, the strike is probably being orchestrated by Maga's political opponents. The situation could provide a convenient pretext for inveterate coup-plotters within the military to move against the government.



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Colombia-Venezuela Boundary



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VENEZUELA-COLOMBIA: Venezuela is reinforcing its troops in the Colombian border area. This action results from exaggerated estimates of Colombian strength on the border, reports of Colombian overflights, Colombian reaction to mass expulsions of their nationals, and a jingoistic campaign by the Venezuelan press. As tensions increase between the two countries, an armed clash along the border can not be ruled out. [REDACTED]

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INDONESIA-MALAYSIA-USSR: Djakarta has begun talks to increase its rubber exports to the Soviet Union, according to press reports. The Soviet Union normally imports about 300,000 tons of rubber annually, of which no more than 15 percent comes from Indonesia and most of the rest from Malaysia. Any sizable Indonesian sales to the USSR would mean a reduction in purchases from Malaysia, because Soviet natural rubber consumption is not likely to increase very much in the next few years. Moscow may be willing to buy more from Indonesia, however, to reduce its large trade deficit with Malaysia, which amounted to \$125 million in 1969. Indonesia, as well as other Southeast Asian rubber producers, are mounting a strong campaign opposing any future US stockpile disposals. [REDACTED]

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